October 13, 2026
A Director Discretionary Decision, designated precedential, was issued on March 18, 2026, denying institution in IPR2025-01579 between Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd. and LG Display Co., Ltd., involving U.S. Patent 11,251,394 B2. The decision holds that, under 35 U.S.C. § 311(a), a foreign government is not a “person” permitted to be a petitioner, or a “real party in interest” (“RPI”) of a petitioner, in an AIA proceeding, and denies institution because the petitioner failed to rebut evidence that a foreign government is its RPI.
LG Display Co., Ltd. (“Patent Owner”) filed a request for discretionary denial of institution (Paper 7, “DD Req.”) in the IPR. Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd., Tianma Microelectronics (HONG KONG) Limited, and Wuhan Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd (collectively “Petitioner”) filed an opposition (Paper 8, “DD Opp.”).
The Patent Owner argued that the Petition should be denied because Petitioner failed to disclose several entities, including a foreign government defense entity, as RPIs and that the failure “presents compelling national security interests supporting denial.” DD Req. 7. Specifically, Patent Owner argued that Petitioner Tianma Microelectronics Co., Ltd. (“Tianma”) is “a subsidiary and an affiliate of Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC), a large aerospace and defense conglomerate wholly owned by the Chinese government.” Id. at 7–8. The Patent Owner further argued that Tianma’s Corporate Disclosure Statement identified AVIC Innovation Holding Limited (“AVIC Innovation”) as owning “10% or more” of Tianma’s stock. The Patent Owner also provided evidence that AVIC is on the Department of Commerce “entity list” (i.e., parties “involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”). Id. at 8–9.
The Petitioner responded that none of the entities Patent Owner identified is an RPI because none funded, controlled, or directed the IPR, or had the ability to control it. DD Opp. 17–19; Ex. 1014, paragraph 4.
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) provides that only “a person” other than the patent owner may file a petition for an IPR. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). In Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 587 U.S. 618 (2019), the Supreme Court held that a U.S. “federal agency is not a ‘person’ who may petition for post-issuance review under the AIA,” id. at 637, but did not address whether that prohibition extends to a foreign government. As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]he patent statutes do not define the term ‘person’” and, therefore, the Court “applies a ‘longstanding interpretive presumption that “person” does not include the sovereign.’” Return Mail, 587 U.S. at 626 (quoting Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 780–81 (2000)). This presumption rests, in part, on the absence of “governments” or “sovereigns” from the definition of a “person” in the Dictionary Act. See 1 U.S.C. § 1; Return Mail, 587 U.S. at 627. Applying the statutory presumption and the Dictionary Act, courts routinely interpret the term “person” in statutes to exclude both federal agencies and foreign governments. See, e.g., Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 281 F.3d 1287, 1307 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 378 (1998).
Based on Return Mail and cases applying the term “person” to foreign governments, a foreign government is not a “person” under the AIA, and therefore is not permitted to seek review of a patent before the Office as a petitioner in AIA proceedings. Thus, if a timely and successful challenge results in a finding that the status of a petitioner (or its RPI) is a foreign government, then the trial could not be instituted, or if instituted, would have to be terminated.
Applying Return Mail symmetrically to foreign governments places those governments on equal footing with the U.S. Government and avoids institution practice allowing petitions from some government entities and denying petitions from others. To decide otherwise would create an unfair, asymmetrical predicament: Foreign governments could challenge U.S. patents, including those owned by the U.S. Government, but the U.S. Government could not challenge patents owned by foreign governments (or anyone else’s patents).
Such a construct would be opposite of Congress’s intent and would serve only to exacerbate national security and economic concerns as foreign governments, many with effectively unlimited resources, would be able to try to invalidate U.S. Government-owned or -licensed patents, or critical privately-owned patents, ad infinitum. Cf. Price v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Indeed, we think it would be highly incongruous to afford greater Fifth Amendment rights to foreign nations, who are entirely alien to our constitutional system, than are afforded to the states, who help make up the very fabric of that system.”).
For the same reasons, Return Mail also bars a petition when a foreign government is an RPI of a petitioner. To hold otherwise (i.e., to conclude that so long as at least one petitioner is a “person” who filed an IPR petition), would create a ready recipe ripe for mischief. To be clear: “Opaque investment structures have been used by foreign adversaries to gain influence over, or access to, U.S. intellectual-property assets and proceedings. State-linked entities have covertly financed or directed U.S. patent challenges, acquisitions, or licensing transactions in sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and advanced materials.” Memorandum, Precedential Designation of Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC v. PPC Broadband Inc., IPR2014-00440, Paper 68 (PTAB Aug. 18, 2015) (Oct. 28, 2025) (“Memorandum”), at 2.
In fact, “[e]ntities identified by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) have been sanctioned or listed for activities including technology misappropriation and forced technology transfer. OFAC and USTR designations, coupled with publicly reported front-entity behavior, demonstrate that foreign state actors have sought to manipulate U.S. IP systems, including administrative challenges before the PTAB, to weaken or misappropriate U.S. technological leadership.” Id.
In this regard, the Director noted that Tianma and companies on the Department of Commerce “entity list” (i.e., parties “involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States”) are frequent IPR petitioners. If treated as a single entity, such petitioners “collectively would be among the top 10 IPR petitioners for the period 2019–2024.” Id. at 3.
Further, a government cannot evade the Return Mail bar simply by enlisting a “person” to do its IPR bidding. Otherwise, a foreign government, or, for that matter, a U.S. federal agency, could do an end-run around Return Mail. That is, the foreign government could simply shield a petition from dismissal by having one or more nominal petitioners file at the government’s behest.
Having established the appropriately congruent legal and policy framework pertaining to governments, whether foreign or domestic, that such entities may not properly be petitioners or RPIs, the factual questions remaining are whether:
(1) at the time the petition was filed, a foreign government was Petitioner’s RPI and, therefore, the petition was barred; or
(2) whether Patent Owner at least put the RPI question into dispute and, if so, whether Petitioner sufficiently rebutted that argument by showing that the foreign government was not an RPI.
Petitioner responded, with nothing more than conclusory testimonial evidence, that none of the entities Patent Owner identified are RPIs because none of the entities “funded, controlled, or directed this IPR, or had the ability to control this IPR. For example, none of these companies had any authority over IPR decisions, participation in strategy or filings, role in expert selection or management.”
Patent Owner’s evidence is sufficient to put into dispute whether the Petition identified all RPIs and whether there is an RPI who is not a “person” eligible to file an IPR. Patent Owner’s evidence that Petitioner is owned by AVIC Innovation and AVIC, AVIC is owned by a foreign government, and AVIC is included on the entity list is particularly persuasive.
With the identification of RPIs in dispute, it was Petitioner’s burden to show that it had named all RPIs and that none was a foreign government or an entity of a foreign government that had the ability to control. See Worlds Inc. v. Bungie, Inc., 903 F.3d 1237, 1242 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Although Petitioner has admitted in court proceedings that AVIC is a significant shareholder, Petitioner did not provide any documents clarifying its relationship with AVIC, such as documents describing the rights attendant to AVIC’s shares. Instead, Petitioner submitted a conclusory declaration that simply stated that none of the entities Patent Owner identifies funded, controlled, or directed the IPR, or had the ability to control the IPR. This type of declaration alone, unsupported by relevant documents, is insufficient to rebut Patent Owner’s credible arguments that Petitioner failed to name all RPIs. As a result, on this record, Petitioner failed to carry its burden to establish that a foreign government is not an RPI. Accordingly, Petitioner is deemed ineligible to file an IPR and the Petition is denied.
In consideration of the foregoing, it is:
ORDERED that the Petition is denied, and no trial is instituted.